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Abstract
This article examines grassroots tech groups as civil society media (CSM) actors
marginalised in the communications policy debate. We aim to insert these key
providers of information communication technology (ICT) infrastructure into dis-
cussions on enabling CSM policy agendas. The article maps their policy objec-
tives, traces their connections to broader Internet governance mechanisms and
explores their potential roles as policy stakeholders. We conclude that grassroots
tech groups, while operating largely outside of the debate, offer unique perspec-
tives and contributions to multi-stakeholder policy dialogue, challenging norms of
inclusion and representation.
Introduction
‘Summit Breaks New Ground with Multi-Stakeholder Approach’ headlined
the official press statement published at the end of the preparation process
for the first World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva
in 2003 (ITU 2003). Focusing on process innovations rather than the-
matic outcomes was symptomatic for the summit debates which stretched
for more than five years and during which the question of participation
of non-state actors often displaced discussions on information and
communication issues. The main summit organiser, the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), had promised a ‘new kind of summit’
based on the ‘full participation’ of ‘new’ actors, particularly business and
civil society.1 Expectations were high that an entirely new form of global
governance would be tested, with non-state actors participating on equal
footing with government delegations. However, while some sections of
(organised) civil society were included in the process, others remained
outside, lacking the resources, the organisational structure or the will
to participate (Hintz 2009). WSIS served as a laboratory for multi-
stakeholderism (Raboy 2004), but it lacked ‘significant participation from
those working directly at the grassroots in initiating and implementing
ICTs’ (Gurstein 2005a).
In this article we will look at some of these actors: grassroots media
activists, radical tech collectives and alternative Internet Service Providers
(ISPs). As typically loose and fluid civil society networks with a precarious
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1 In this article we refer
to ‘civil society’ as the
non-governmental
and non-commercial
sector, that is, a social
sphere beyond state
and business, and 
we thus follow recent
definitions used
within the United
Nations (Cardoso 
et al. 2004: 13).
financial basis, these groups are likely to face challenges with regards to
their inclusion in forums of policy debate. The emerging field of Internet
governance offers a test case for the participation of these grassroots
actors in policy-making. Such groups have contributed substantial inno-
vations to the development of online infrastructure (see, e.g. Kahn 2004)
and are immediately affected by policy changes, thus it would seem rea-
sonable that their policy concerns are reflected in relevant debates. As a
core post-WSIS policy arena, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) offers
opportunities to trace the development of ‘multi-stakeholderism’.
This article presents the results of online interviews that we conducted
with members of grassroots tech groups. We identify policy preferences
and attitudes towards a policy space such as the IGF, and develop a
broader perspective on the relation between grassroots activists in media,
communication and policy arenas. First, we clarify what we mean by
‘grassroots tech groups’, point to the multi-stakeholder experiences at
WSIS and IGF, then summarise and analyse their responses on policy
objectives and governance structures. Finally, we extract challenges and
suggestions for the development of participatory media governance.2
Grassroots tech groups
Definition and role: running servers for social change
In using the term ‘grassroots tech groups’, we refer to groups providing
alternative communication infrastructure to civil society activists and citi-
zens on a voluntary basis through collective organising principles, with
the aim of counteracting commercial as well as state pressures on infor-
mation content, media access and the privacy of media users.3 Grassroots
tech groups usually offer web-based services such as website hosting, 
e-mail and mailing list services, chats and other tools such as anonymous
re-mailers and instant messaging; or provide platforms for self-production
of information.4 Common elements amongst these actors include5:
• Autonomy and emancipation: Developing self-organised alternative
infrastructures is a means of emancipation from predominant providers
of information and communication channels, and from over-arching
business and government control.
• Direct action: Implementing an alternative production mode, they
reject capitalist logic and government intervention. Their cultural and
political backgrounds include anarchist thought, do-it-yourself culture
and cyber-libertarianism. Such perspectives overlap with the values of
early Internet pioneers who advocated minimal state regulation and
maximum freedom for technical experts and civil society actors to
develop infrastructures according to their needs.6
• Collectivism: They are often organised as collectives of equals working
on a voluntary basis, with horizontal consensus-building and a
rejection of formal leadership and representation – in the words of one
activist: ‘free, networked collaboration and shared production’
(Interviewee 1 2007). The sustainability of the projects depends on
the voluntary contribution of knowledge, skills, time and financial
support.
2 Adilson Cabral 
from Fluminense
University, Brazil,
contributed valuable
comments and 
participated in the
drafting of this paper.
We wish to thank 
him for his important
contribution.
3 This definition is to be
intended as analytical
tool which tries to
incorporate
procedural and
identity aspects which
are relevant to our
study, and to be as
inclusive as possible.
A recent People’s
Global Action 
(PGA) meeting 
on communication
infrastructures
identified alternative
ISPs as ‘organisations
running a server to
support movements
for political change 
to get direct access
and participatory
access to the web 
and media’ (People’s
Global Action 2007).
The ‘group’ is seen as
‘functional units that
can make decisions’
(idem).
4 Examples include 
the Spanish
SinDominio (www.
sindominio.net), 
the Italian Autistici/
Inventati (www.
autistici.org), the
German Nadir
(www.nadir.org), 
the Dutch ASCII 
and PUSCII
(puscii.squat.net), 
the North American
riseup.net, and the
open-publishing 
platforms of the
Indymedia network
(www.indymedia.org).
5 The following list
draws from interviews
with grassroots tech
activists and analysis
of website content
(mission statements
and calls for action).
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• Service for, and members of, social movements: They seek to empower
activists and civil society actors by providing communication infrastruc-
ture and information exchange tools: ‘our tech activism involves spread-
ing voices so that they can’t be shut by authorities’ (People’s Global
Action 2006). Supporting other struggles, they constitute a form of
‘meta-organisation activism’ (Interviewee 8 2008). At the same time
they are an intrinsic part of social movements, and contribute to their
agenda-setting by raising awareness of privacy protection and knowl-
edge issues, ‘rejecting the globalising cultural and mediatic censorship
of imagination and the attempts to sell us pre-digested dreams’
(Autistici/Inventati 2002). Members are often active also in other fields,
such as environmental politics, anti-racism and anti-fascism.
A typical radical tech collective would consist of half a dozen volunteer
media activists who are often, but not necessarily, based in the same town.
Some have weekly meetings for strategic discussions and decisions, some
even operate a computer laboratory or an Internet cafe, but most commu-
nication and work takes place online via e-mail and chat. Daily tasks
include managing webservers and list-servs, larger projects may include
developing software tools, such as content management systems or
encryption programmes that other civil society activists can use for their
communication and campaigns.
They become more visible when they step out of cyberspace. Radical
tech groups have established media centres at major protest events such as
those against G8 meetings. Indymedia UK, for example, have set up tents
with computer equipment in the middle of actions and action camps to
allow other activists to write and upload reports directly from the street.
The group Nadir once transformed a countryside barn in a remote North
German village into a high-tech media hub that provided thousands of
environmental activists with sophisticated communication infrastructure,
enabling them to send out their reports on a protest against nuclear waste
shipments to a global audience.
Grassroots tech groups and civil society media
Within the increasing academic interest in community media (Howley
2005), alternative media (Atton 2002; Coyer, Dowmunt and Fountain
2007), radical media (Downing 2001) and citizens media (Rodriguez
2001), as well as the emerging interest by policy-makers in these media
(European Parliament 2007; Lewis 2007), grassroots tech groups have
received little attention. The prime concern of these studies is with the
production of content and thus with radios, newsletters, community TV
stations and websites as content providers, not with developers of commu-
nication infrastructure.
However, we do believe that grassroots tech groups are an integral and
crucial player in the broader field of civil society media as defined by Hadl
and Hintz (2009). They adhere to the main characteristics of the sector,
such as civil society ownership and control; non-profit, social objectives;
democratic and participatory structures; and most of them either provide
alternative content or assist others in doing so. Furthermore, they bring in
6 Based on Dave Clark’s
famous creed from
1992 – ‘We reject
kings, presidents 
and voting. We
believe in rough
consensus and
running code’ –
cyberlibertarians
oppose state
interventions into 
the innovations 
and the creativity of
individual developers
(Barlow 1996), civil
society-based creators
of information
technology and small
businesses. In the 
rare cases in which
state regulation is
considered, it should
be based on the
prerogative: ‘First, 
do no harm’ (Cerf
2004: 13).
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new perspectives on access to, and participation in, media-making, connect
with more recent innovations regarding free software, user-generated
content and individualised media production, and thus provide an impor-
tant link between the organisational and political approaches of ‘older’
civil society media and newer technological as well as social developments.
Multi-stakeholderism at WSIS and beyond
World summits and civil society
The nation state-centred world, in which sovereign states represented
the basic units in the international system and international policy-
making based on inter-state diplomacy, has increasingly been challenged
by, amongst other factors, the growing capacities, power and resources of
transnational business and civil society. Accordingly, the concept of global
governance has gained prominence, focusing on systems of rules and
interdependent problem-solving by a diversity of actors on a diversity of
policy levels. Control has become more dispersed, and capacity for deci-
sion-making and implementation more widely distributed, forming ‘layers
of governance spreading within and across political boundaries’ and trans-
forming ‘sovereignty into the shared exercise of power’ (Held and McGrew
2003: 11).
The world conferences of the 1990s offered construction sites for
global governance. They invented a ‘new dramaturgy of world politics’
(Messner and Nuscheler 2003: 4) by going beyond the diplomatic exclu-
sivity of states. The UN Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 set a precedent, and a series of
summits on core concerns such as human rights, cities, gender and devel-
opment followed.
The preparation process towards the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS) promised further progress, with private sector and civil
society to be recognised as ‘partners’ and to be treated ‘as peers and equals
to nation-states’ (Ó Siochrú 2004: 334). A large number of NGOs and
other civil society actors came to participate and created effective mecha-
nisms for lobbying and thematic exchange. However, they also faced
serious obstacles in accessing the summit stage and in participating mean-
ingfully, particularly with regards to accreditation, funding and exclusion
from negotiations.
The requirements for receiving accreditation for the WSIS process were
geared towards formal NGOs and failed to consider the structural back-
ground of those civil society actors that are organised as loose grassroots
groups, non-hierarchical networks and temporary coalitions.7 The regis-
tration process for the summit involved privacy infringements (Bendrath
and Panganiban 2003), which discouraged some civil society activists
from participating. Several groups, such as Reporters Sans Frontiers and
Tunisian human rights groups, were not allowed to participate at all.
Financially, effective participation in WSIS preparatory conferences
involved covering flight tickets and two weeks of hotel accommodation,
food and drinks in an expensive Swiss city – several times a year. Little
funding was provided for civil society delegates by the WSIS organisers.
Again, only larger NGOs, which could mobilise sufficient funds, for example
7 In their WSIS
evaluation ‘Much
more could have 
been achieved’, civil
society participants 
of the WSIS process
expressed the urgent
need to develop
‘clearer and less
bureaucratic rules 
of recognition for
accrediting Civil
Society organisations
in the UN system’
(Civil Society Plenary
2005: 15).
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through established contacts with potential donors, could cope with this
restriction. Finally, and despite the initial promises by summit organisers,
the new non-governmental ‘stakeholders’ were reduced to the status of
‘observers’ (WSIS Executive Secretariat 2002) who were allowed to attend
only ‘public’ (WSIS Executive Secretariat 2002) sessions and who were
excluded from actual decision-making processes and spaces. Only the
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) came close to a true
multi-stakeholder design (WGIG 2004).
Broad participation?
Participants and observers agree that WSIS has helped to open previously
closed spaces of inter-governmental debate to organised groups of citizens
and activists. Civil society groups praised the ‘innovative rules and prac-
tices of participation’ established in some areas of the WSIS process and
highlighted WGIG as a particularly innovative format ‘where governmen-
tal and Civil Society actors worked on an equal footing’ (Civil Society
Plenary 2005: 7). The high degree of formalisation of civil society involve-
ment in WSIS as well as the autonomous structures created by civil
society participants, argues media scholar and WSIS observer Marc Raboy,
‘form the basis of a new model of representation and legitimation of 
non-governmental input to global affairs’, and as a result, ‘the rules and
parameters of global governance have shifted’ (Raboy 2004: 349). However,
access by non-state actors to the negotiation process ‘was fragile, was
frequently challenged and regularly withdrawn’ (Ó Siochrú 2004:
338). Insufficient opportunities for participation risked to reduce multi-
stakeholderism to a ‘rhetoric exercise aimed at neutralising criticism
through the adoption of an unproblematic consensual understanding of
political life’ (Padovani and Pavan 2007: 100).
Such lack of participation concerned the North-South divide, leading
to an overall European dominance in civil society attendance at WSIS
(Cammaerts and Carpentier 2006). Yet, it also concerned the separation
in established NGOs, on the one side, and broader social movements, on
the other, which has characterised recent institutional processes. Many of
those who were building the information society in their everyday prac-
tices were either missing or participated in alternative events outside the
summit compound. Few autonomous media practitioners, free software
developers and creators of grassroots communication infrastructure, such
as citizen-based community wireless networks, attended the summits.
Community informatics researcher Michael Gurstein noted that ‘while
there has been a very considerable degree of “talking about” ICTs for
Development there has been remarkably little “talking with” those who
are actually doing the job on the ground’ (Gurstein 2005b), which would
then lead to the question of ‘how to provide a meaningful and effective
voice for this “larger civil society”’ (Gurstein 2005a).
Internet governance forum
The most prominent outcome of WSIS has been the establishment of the
Internet Governance Forum (IGF), a new forum for a multi-stakeholder
dialogue on Internet policy. Its mandate has been to ‘discuss public policy
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issues related to key elements of Internet governance in order to foster the
sustainability, robustness, security, stability and development of the Internet’
(IGF 2006a) and to involve all relevant stakeholders in this debate. The
IGF does not have a decision-making role and cannot negotiate binding
agreements but it can set policy agendas.
The first meeting of the IGF took place in Athens, Greece in 2006. It
followed in the footsteps of WGIG8 by allowing for open debate, advancing
WSIS practices and moving closer to ‘full participation’.9 One innovation
has been the establishment of ‘Dynamic Coalitions’ in which members of
all stakeholder groups discuss specific Internet policy sub-themes – such
as spam, privacy, freedom of expression, linguistic diversity – and try to
find common positions. However, despite these progressive steps, several of
the above-mentioned access challenges persist. A large number of NGO
representatives have participated in meetings and debates, but grassroots
tech groups, as we define them, are missing. Internet governance researcher
Elena Pavan (2007) has criticised the predominance of Western views in
IGF deliberations and the lack of representativeness of civil society actors.
Methodology
In collecting data for this article we adopted a qualitative approach, con-
ducting e-mail interviews. E-mail interviewing is a specific form of online
interaction, consisting of an asynchronous exchange of questions and
answers (Kivitz 2005). We chose this method because radical tech groups
are typically online-based and we believe that the researcher should relate
to the object of inquiry according to the ways ‘in which social practices are
defined and experienced’ (Hine 2005: 1). Interviews took place over a
period of several weeks around the IGF 2007. Activists were asked to
provide details about threats and obstacles to their activities, values under-
lying their activism, their vision on Internet regulation, their attitude
towards policy fora and more specifically the IGF. Interviews were con-
ducted in English, Spanish and Portuguese. One third of interviewees
asked to submit their answers encrypted with the widely-used encryption
programme Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) or similar tools.
The interviewees were members of eight different radical tech groups
based in Europe. Occupational and class backgrounds were diverse,
ranging from information technology (IT) professionals, academics and
freelance programmers to students, temporary workers and unemployed.
Age varied between early twenties and early forties, gender was predomi-
nantly male. A first group of interviewees were asked to reply as individual
members of a group or as individual Internet activists. In this, we assumed
that individuals reflect a group culture. A second set of interviewees replied
collectively following an internal group debate. This was time-consuming
but appropriate, since, as one of our interviewees put it, ‘alternative
ISPs are collective enterprises and by contacting and making questions to
individual people you are breaking down the collective dimension’
(Interviewee 3 2007).
To protect interviewees’ privacy, they are identified in this text only as
‘Interviewee’, followed by a number. Several radical tech collectives have
faced serious repression due to their vital support for social and dissident
8 For a comprehensive
historical overview
from the WSIS to 
the first IGF, see
Shtern 2007.
9 However
governmental and
institutional delegates
do retain a slightly
more prominent role
at IGF, for example 
in the IGF advisory
group, see IGF
(2006b).
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movements. Connecting their names and/or the names of their collectives
directly with particular activities or political statements may increase the
risk of repression and would expose information about particular groups
and individuals – information that can potentially be used against them.
Internet governance and grassroots tech groups: 
a missing link?
This section will analyse the perceptions and attitudes of grassroots tech
activists towards institutional policy processes. It draws from the interview
transcripts to specify what these groups consider as threats to their pro-
jects and values, and which aspects of the Internet should be regulated in
which way from their perspective.
Threats: state repression and corporate interventions
Grassroots media activists identify state repression as a primary threat and
obstacle to their work. As most of the projects operate on a local or
national basis, state intervention ‘is the most immediate repressive frame’
(Interviewee 7 2007), despite the supposedly global and borderless nature
of the Internet. Grassroots media projects are facing surveillance and
harassment in many countries, including Western democracies. In Europe,
some have been targeted with anti-terrorism charges (e.g. SO36 in Germany
and Autistici/Inventati in Italy) and had their equipment confiscated and
members’ flats raided by police. According to one interviewee, govern-
ments increasingly seek to ‘intimidate members of the group’ as ‘they see
us as part of a dissident movement’ (Interviewee 2 2007). In some coun-
tries (for example, Oaxaca, Mexico), activists are facing arrests, disappear-
ance, rape in custody and even death (Interviewee 4 2007). Some claim
that state repression has included ‘political attack against our websites’
(Interviewee 7 2007), that is, technical sabotage.
Interviewees see a major threat in national policies and supranational
regulations, particularly as they concern increasing state surveillance, for
example through new legislation in many countries on data retention,
which ‘forces us to disclose information about our users to the govern-
ment’ (Interviewee 2 2007). This places tech groups ‘in a severe ideologi-
cal dilemma between having to accept the law and power, and at the same
time guarantee the right to the privacy of our users. Whenever we refuse “to
collaborate” with the judicial authority, we must face a judicial process,
which, financially, is very expensive for activist projects’ (Interviewee 7
2007). A second tier of obstructive legislation is seen in intellectual prop-
erty regulation, which contrasts the groups’ objectives of enhancing free
knowledge exchange with obligations to limit such exchange. Corporate
interventions constitute a further obstacle, as business players interfere
with the operations of grassroots tech groups through technological
means (e.g. domain name filters provided by telecommunication compa-
nies) and legal means. Several interviewees report libel cases against small
media projects that do not have the resources to defend themselves in
court and therefore have to obey and/or pay compensation charges,
placing a heavy burden on their scarce funds – even when the legal situa-
tion is unclear. Finally, the dominant role of major political and corporate
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actors in standard-setting and policy formulation is seen as a more general
obstacle, as it leads to unfavourable policy priorities and shapes the
Internet in a way that is problematic for media activists.
Overall, the actors who are seen as the major source of threats are also
seen as dominating transnational policy processes – governments and
large businesses. There is less reference amongst interviewees to North-
South divides than there was amongst NGO members at WSIS. The inter-
viewees regard both Northern and Southern governments as threats and
as potential (or actual) censors, and they mistrust ‘democratisation’ agendas
that involve governments.
The best regulation is user-based self-regulation
With regards to policy objectives, interviewees emphasise freedom of the
Internet and freedom of information. According to most interviewees, all
policy and regulation should be geared towards this primary aim. While
generally sceptical of regulatory measures, they consider regulation com-
patible or even necessary in two areas: anti-monopoly regulation and
privacy protection.
Anti-monopoly measures are important to check and balance business
power, ‘assuring that the Internet remains a free space for communica-
tion’ (Interviewee 3 2007). For the same reason, open technological stan-
dards are to be supported and preserved. Privacy and rights protection are
seen as crucial means to limit excessive state surveillance and protect the
right to anonymity and the rights to political dissent.
However, interviewees are highly sceptical of the notion that transna-
tional policy dialogue can achieve progress in these areas: ‘I am not con-
vinced at all that any major institution or international body would try to
regulate, or create policy, in a way that it would not favour states and cor-
porations’ (Interviewee 4 2007). Regulation would necessarily ‘defend
concrete ideological interests’ (Interviewee 7 2007) that are diametrically
opposed to the interests of social movements. Therefore, most interviewees
emphasise a ‘hands-off ’ approach in sensitive areas such as content,
freedom of expression and privacy. The ‘basic rights of the Internet user:
privacy of communications, right to anonymity, right to freedom of expres-
sion and to political dissent’ (Interviewee 7 2007) should be ‘unregulated’
in a way that ‘we reject any regulatory attempt by the state or suprana-
tional institutions on these issues’ (Interviewee 7 2007). Content ‘should
be regulated only by the end users themselves’ (Interviewee 2 2007).
Internet-specific legislation is seen as a particular threat. ‘If fraud is a
crime it is equally a crime on the Internet and should be pursued but not
by introducing additional regulatory or control procedures’ (Interviewee 3
2007). Also, ‘intellectual property should not be a regulatory principle
since there is just no sense of property if the goods are infinite (no regula-
tion of human oxygen intake is needed if there is air for everyone)’
(Interviewee 3 2007).
Interviewees suggest self-regulation by those who are actually develop-
ing and using the Internet. This includes ‘non-binding standards that gain
popularity based on their quality, usefulness and ease of use/implementa-
tion’ (Interviewee 5 2007). Most importantly, any regulation should be
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done with the maximum possible degree of plurality and inclusion of the
‘Internet community’ (Interviewee 7 2007). One interviewee argues,
‘democratically chosen groups of technical experts that operate in a very
open and transparent way are the best approach for this kind of regula-
tion’ (Interviewee 3 2007).
‘In principle, no’: criticising policy-making arenas
The immediate answer of most interviewees to the question on whether
they would get involved in policy-making processes if invited to is a strong
‘no’. Most suspect that that civil society participation is just ‘decorative’
(Interviewee 3 2007), that the actual decisions are taken elsewhere, that
is by corporate and government actors, and that ‘the invitation would be
just for the record, so the institution or the body would gain political and
cultural capital’ (Interviewee 4 2007). Participation, in that sense, would
‘legitimize the decisions taken by other agents (corporations, governments,
lobbies, etc.)’ (Interviewee 3 2007). Therefore, ‘we want to maintain a
certain distance from this institutional and falsely “democratic” internet
[regulation]’ (Interviewee 7 2007).10
Furthermore, the interviewed media activists stress that their focus is on
creating actual communications infrastructure, rather than on advocacy.
One interviewee: ‘I don’t think we need to focus in “asking” or “having a
voice”. I think we have “to do”, “keep doing” and keep building working
structures and alternatives that are diametrically opposed to the ways capi-
talism forces us to function in our everyday lives. Our job, as activists, is to
create self-managed infrastructures that work regardless of “their” regula-
tions, laws or any other form of governance’ (Interviewee 4 2007).
The scarce time and energy available to media activists (all intervie-
wees work as volunteers), is ‘better spent building alternatives outside the
system’ (Interviewee 1 2007), whereas policy-making processes are seen
as ‘distraction’ (Interviewee 4 2007) that would keep activists away from
their core activities. Connecting the practical focus with the policy level,
one interviewee says: ‘Any policy which does not come from the sponta-
neous understanding of the people or the personal dedication of a group of
individuals is unworthy of developing’ (Interviewee 5 2007).
Lack of interest in the WSIS debate was due to different priorities
combined with a perception that the process ‘look[ed] too complicated’
(Interviewee 2 2007). The hurdle of procedural complication mirrors the
hurdle of technical understanding that many WSIS participants were facing.
The WSIS process, in the view of media activists, compromised its legitimacy
by assembling actors with procedural but not necessarily technical skills. It
created a perception that, at policy fora such as WSIS, ‘stakeholders who
have decision making powers demonstrate their utter ignorance of the
systems that they are supposed to govern’ (Interviewee 5 2007).
The aspect of ‘norm change’, which is usually seen in the social move-
ment literature as core motivation and strategy of civil society actors par-
ticipating in policy processes (Sikkink 2005), does not play a major role for
the media activists that were interviewed. There is no trust in norm
change through participation in policy processes, but only through practi-
cal deeds and the development of concrete alternatives.
10 One of the possible
risks is the cooptation
of activists by
comparably ‘friendly’
governments. For
example, the
government of Brasil
which raised a strong
voice in favour of
progressive values,
such as access to
knowledge and free
software, in the WSIS
process, seeks to
incorporate media
activists in its
programmes of 
‘digital inclusion’. The
resulting dislocation
of activists (and 
their expertise) from
the grassroots to
governmental
initiatives can weaken
grassroots projects
and create tensions
within the broader
social movement and
civil society networks.
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IGF, that Big Unknown. And, by the way, ‘is there 
really any power there?’11
Awareness levels of the details of policy debates at the Internet Governance
Forum are generally low.12 The reasons given overlap with the responses
to the interest in transnational policy-making, and develop around two
claims: (a) marginal impact of the process, (b) the need to focus on practi-
cal work at the expense of advocacy. Policy fora such as the IGF are
believed to have little actual impact and there is deep distrust in their
outcomes and in the usefulness of engaging with them. Civil society
participation is not expected to lead to substantial change. As one of the
respondents put it, ‘it is a puppet theatre, internet governance is being
decided somewhere else (Microsoft, Cisco, IP international regulation . . .)’
(Interviewee 3 2007).
Moreover, interviewees lay the focus of their activities on practical
work and on the local or national level: ‘I guess in my case it is a matter of
time more than a lack of interest. I would not mind knowing more about
it, but then again, as I said, our focus is to “keep doing”, and to learn and
develop by doing so. To put it in a crude example: if I have to choose
between debating issues of governance, or setting up a Public Access Point
at the No Border Camp for example, I’m afraid I’ll chose the second’
(Interviewee 4 2007). There is more trust in achieving change through
practical social and technological development than through advocacy:
‘by the time the governance forum arrives to any conclusions, we will
have moved on anyway’ (Interviewee 4 2007). However, there is also little
understanding on how the IGF differs from WSIS and other UN-based fora.
Multi-stakeholderism revisited
If a policy process is to be fully legitimate, the preferences of a broad range
of actors would need to be included into policy agendas, and fundamental
access barriers to global governance arenas would need to be lowered.
This section will provide some considerations on reviewing multi-stake-
holder governance and summarise issues that may need to be strength-
ened in media policy debates.
Policy objectives
As the interviews have shown, members of grassroots tech groups ques-
tion the need for extensive regulation. They only accept regulatory action
where it maintains and enhances the freedom of the Internet and user/
citizen/civil rights, by preventing excessive interventions by powerful
private and state actors. Open technological standards, the right to
anonymity, network neutrality, privacy, freedom of expression and the free
flow of knowledge and information (and thus the absence of both direct
and indirect restrictions, such as censorship and intellectual property
rights) would constitute core demands, but interviewees doubt that these
can be enforced in government- and business-led policy arenas.
They put more faith in developing technical by-passes around policy
challenges, in self-regulation by end-users, and in non-binding standards
that allow the best solution for a particular problem to flourish. They, thus,
show connections with anarchist thought but also with a cyberlibertarian
11 Interviewee 3 2007.
12 Only one activist
declared interest in
the IGF but ‘my
personal aim is to
prove scientifically 
the futileness of 
the process in terms
of direct practical
outcomes’
(Interviewee 5 2007).
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belief in openness, transparency and the power of users and of technical
experts, and they uncover links with the demands for self-regulation by
the private sector. Grassroots tech groups create an ‘autonomous zone’
which needs protection from the threats coming from outside that zone,
threats which originate from the business sector and the state. Yet the
means of protecting that zone is technological self-defence, rather than
advocacy and participation in policy processes.
This roughly-sketched agenda is consistent with the more elaborate
policy goals developed by media activists around the WSIS process, partic-
ularly at the alternative series of events WSIS?WeSeize! that took place
parallel to the first WSIS summit in Geneva. WSIS?WeSeize! promoted the
development of autonomous and civil society-based media infrastructures,
highlighted openness as a practice to counter state- and business-led poli-
cies of privatisation and control, criticised state censorship and surveil-
lance as well as the privatisation of ideas through intellectual property
law, and discussed the exploitation of immaterial work and information-
alised labour. WSIS?WeSeize! participants questioned underlying power
relations in the current arrangement of global governance, particularly at
global summits and in international institutions, and they rejected WSIS
as an illegitimate attempt by business and state elites to regulate (in their
view: control, repress and appropriate) processes which had been initiated
in the civil society and grassroots realm (Hintz 2009).
Obstacles to participation
Members of grassroots tech groups point to a variety of reasons why they
do not participate in policy processes such as WSIS and IGF:
• Time and resources: As voluntary activists, they lack the time for advo-
cacy. Financial resources to pay advocacy-related salaries may theoret-
ically ease time pressures but would be seen as a contradiction to the
voluntary, collective and non-hierarchical character of the projects.
• Focus on practices: There is a strong priority on setting up grassroots
infrastructure and establishing alternatives to mainstream content,
infrastructure and organisational models. Some think this is the only
way to achieve change.
• Scepticism towards policy processes: Institutional arenas and policy
debates are criticised for their deep imbalances, with certain state and
business actors setting the agenda.
• Core values: This scepticism, furthermore, is consistent with the core
values that all interviewees highlight as a foundation of their work,
particularly autonomy and diversity, thus a rejection of centralist
decision-making.
This brief overview suggests that the most straightforward remedies which
were identified, for example, around the WSIS process – such as providing
financial assistance and changing rules for registration and accreditation –
may be necessary preconditions but would not be sufficient for involving a
broader set of actors. A policy forum such as IGF would also need to
respond to structural challenges which grassroots tech groups highlight
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and to transform the policy process more fundamentally. We will point to
some of these challenges and transformations in the next section.
Towards participatory governance
Grassroots tech groups (and, generally, a growing number of social
movements, civil society groups and citizen initiatives) are structured in a
way that is incompatible with current institutional processes. As collec-
tive enterprises they regard consensus decision-making and consultation
of all members as a foundation of their work, and they therefore
reject traditional forms of representation – both political representation
through election and organisational representation through leaders,
chairs or CEOs. Assigning decision-making power to a representative, for
example to one member participating in a policy forum, conflicts with
collective organising principles. Moreover, time-consuming collective
decision processes make it difficult to rapidly respond to policy deliberations
and to quickly-evolving document drafts at, for example, UN summits.
The latter, therefore, offers no suitable space for non-representational
collectives.
A different yet related challenge concerns the role of individuals in
information/communication activism. Informal online movements, tem-
porary ‘tactical media’ (Garcia and Lovink 1999), individualised online
campaigning and the emergence of technological developer-activists have
all changed the face of civil society and have diversified the latter beyond
the classical formally-established non-governmental organisation (NGO).
If policy institutions are serious about including ‘civil society’, they need to
create mechanisms to accommodate such informal and individual
activism. Some media developers and activists have thus proposed to
transform the NGO-oriented civil society participation models into ‘a free
assembly of women and men, each equal to each other’ (Bertola 2005)
that allow ‘people to speak for themselves in the forums in which decisions
(. . .) are made and not require that they act through artificial proxies’
(Auerbach 2005). This would certainly conflict with the collective
approach favoured by grassroots tech groups. However, both approaches
point to the disintegration of traditional forms of formal organisation,
which affects both organised civil society and inter-national (inter-state)
policy-making.
Developing a response may require ‘a new logics of politics’ charac-
terised by ‘non-representational democratic models of decision making’
(Lovink and Rossiter 2005). Concepts such as ‘organised networks’ (Lovink
and Rossiter 2005) and ‘United Constituencies’ (Kleinwächter 2005) relate
to this challenge. ‘Constituencies’ have emerged as an important social
category, which identifies members not according to citizenship and geo-
graphical territory, but according to common interest, a common history,
and common language. ‘Constituencies’, thus, take note of the ‘reconfigu-
ration of social space’ towards ‘relative deterritorialization’ and growing
‘supraterritoriality’ (Scholte 2000: 46, 50).13
A ‘new logics of politics’, however, may not stop at the ‘United
Constituencies’ replacing or complementing the United Nations. The
concept of ‘unity’, and thus centralist regulatory measures, may be equally
13 Using similar
terminology, but
leaving the ‘territory’
of national concepts
further behind, the
Indymedia UK
network which
consists of several
local groups all over
the United Kingdom
uses the abbreviation
‘UK’ for ‘United
Kollectives’.
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out-dated. From the perspective of grassroots tech groups, a united global
summit or forum increasingly looks like a dinosaur that belongs to another
era. Rather, these groups speak to a radical decentralisation of global gov-
ernance and to a bottom-up approach to policy-making, which places
those that are directly affected by policy measures at the centre of gover-
nance efforts. This may not just imply an increased involvement of civil
society actors but a restructuring towards a more decentralised network of
interrelated policy clusters.
Conclusion
Grassroots tech groups offer an interesting perspective on the relation
between civil society media and policy. They not only contribute a distinct
policy agenda that centres on privacy, information rights, openness and
self-regulation, but they also favour a praxis-focused approach over policy
advocacy. Developing alternative infrastructure and technological ‘by-
passes’ around laws and regulations is valued more than participating in
policy dialogue with governments and the private sector. They largely
operate ‘beyond’ policy processes, that is, they do not interact directly with
the policy level, and thus they differ from both ‘insiders’ who pursue a
cooperative strategy of active engagement in institutional processes, and
‘outsiders’ who adopt confrontational forms of protest (also see Milan and
Hintz 2007).
Their political agenda enriches the debate on civil society media
policy, but it also leaves a few question marks. Their strong focus on self-
regulation by users and technical experts shows overlaps with cyber-
libertarian myths and the policy preferences of the private sector. They
also display limited concern with structural factors that interfere with
free self-regulation. Such factors would include the uneven distribution of
technical knowledge and thus the concentration of influence amongst a
small number of technical experts, and North-South dimensions that may
require different policies (and a different governmental role) in the global
North and South to deal with fundamental and long-lasting disparities.
Grassroots tech groups provide us with a view on the deficiencies of
current multi-stakeholder global governance. They highlight the impor-
tance of considering broader parts of civil society, in addition to established
NGOs, if transnational policy-making is to be democratic, participatory
and thus legitimate. At the same time they show that it would be insuffi-
cient to just invite those broader sets of actors to existing policy debates.
The concept of ‘inclusion’, which has been so prominent at WSIS and else-
where, is a double-edged sword. An ‘inclusive’ process that continues to be
led by the ‘old’ powers of the governmental and inter-governmental realm
or the ‘new’ powers of the business realm will remain unacceptable for
many of ‘those working directly at the grass roots in initiating and imple-
menting ICTs’ (Gurstein 2005a, see above). ‘Inclusion’ is not the only –
and, arguably, not the main – challenge for participatory and legitimate
governance; but ‘creation’ of new governance mechanisms that reflect the
aspirations, skills, roles and organisational structures of all actors that
make a relevant contribution to the further development of, or are affected
by, the issues that are at stake.
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